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1 Introduction
It is simplistic to regard corruption in Latin
America as a feature of the bad old corporatist past,
easily to be dissolved by thoroughgoing liberal eco-
nomic reform and democratization. On the con-
trary, successive historical shifts from mercantilism
to liberalism and back again have been marked by
struggles for control of the power rhetoric of anti-
corruption, and there is no reason to regard the
current struggle as already won by the contempo-
rary predominance of neo-liberalism in the region.
Democracy, seen by many as the natural concomi-
tant of economic liberalism, provides strong temp-
tations for corrupt behaviour. Political parties do
not run on conviction alone. Expenditure in the
1986 election campaign in the Brazilian state of
Pernambuco is said to have amounted to sus 20
per voter, or almost 3 per cent of GDP: an extreme,
but not an isolated example (Aguiar 1994).
But this is not all. It is true that many of the cor-
ruption scandals that have plagued Latin America
in recent years have been beached whales of the old
corporatism, stranded by a receding tide. But the
current style of economic reform carries its own
opportunities for corruption: first, through the re-
emergence of private monopoly in sectors long
reserved to the state because of their public sensi-
tivity; second, and more subtly, by placing exces-
sive concentration of executive power in the hands
of small bands of technocratic reformers, confident
that their fine ends justify dubiously constitutional
means, or worse.
A recent Argentine corruption scandal, the Yabran
affair, reflects both these species of contemporary
corruption. When reforming Economics Minister,
Domingo Cavallo, alleged that the main bidder for
control of national postal and courier services had
used corrupt and coercive means to shape the pri-
vatization bill and intended, if successful, to use
the system for criminal purposes, he came very
close to being forced out of office. I shall use this
case to illustrate the dual dynamics of corruption in
the era of economic liberalization and democratic
government in Argentina. To be fruitfully under-
stood, however, the Yabran affair needs to be
viewed in the context of economic and political
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2 Corruption in Historical Context
The Argentine case merits close attention because it
nicely captures some of the ambiguities and con-
flicts that surround the very concept of corruption.
A simplistic interpretation has taken hold among
policy makers in North America, and even some in
Latin America itself, that characterizes corruption as
a set of obstacles to the implementation of eco-
nomic reform and democratization left over from
the corporatist past. It was in this spirit that Alberto
Dahik, Vice-President of Ecuador, called for a pan-
American anti-corruption drive in March 1994. But
things are more complicated than this new brush
approach would suggest. Privatization and eco-
nomic reform may easily open the door to new
forms of corruption whereby common weal and
body politic are afflicted by overweening private
corporations or 'Mafias'. As in the past, the battle is
on for possession of the terms of debate.
On the one hand, purist political liberals have long
maintained that the purpose of economic reform is
not just to increase welfare but to get rid of corrup-
tion. Throughout the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries opponents of mercantilism
were every bit as much concerned to ensure free
access to markets by breaking up the regional trade
monopolies of the British East India Company or
the privileged merchants of the handful of Spanish
ports who were permitted to trade with the Indies
as they were to reduce tariffs. Equally, contempo-
rary British reformers were concerned to draw clear
boundaries between the public and the private
sphere, bringing to an end a system that had
allowed private corporations to operate their own
armies, courts, prisons, and, in effect, foreign pol-
icy, while establishing instead the principle that all
firms might compete on equal terms under the dis-
passionate protection of the law and the Royal Navy.
These moves formed part of a larger strategy, which
included the economic emasculation of a suppos-
edly war-loving aristocracy, reform of local govern-
ment, and extension of the franchise, by which
liberals aspired to circumscribe and choke what was
termed 'The Old Corruption' (Cain 1979;
Rubinstein 1983). Economic liberalization, democ-
ratization and the battle against corruption, it was
assuméd, marched hand in hand.
Yet within a century, the relatively unfettered oper-
ation of the private sector in the handful of leading
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industrial economies had itself produced concen-
trations of power and pools of deprivation that
together threatened the public good. This was
clearly recognized in the United States by Populists
and Progressives and before long yielded the noble,
if ultimately ineffective, edifice of antitrust law and
the less than noble racist immigration policies of the
1920s. In Britain, imperialists of the early twenti-
eth century concerned above all with state security
in an age of war and economic crisis, were willing
to compromise the individualism of an earlier liber-
alism. This shibboleth was abandoned as the
Liberal administration of 1906 started once again to
extend the public sphere to deal with poverty, ill
health, and the abuse of monopoly For these prob-
lems were now to be regarded as corruptions of the
body politic because they transgressed the old fron-
tier between private and public to threaten general
well-being, national efficiency, and security.
Such reactions were not limited to the United States
and Britain, nor even to the major belligerents of
the world wars of the twentieth century They were
also mimicked in those countries, like Argentina
and Brazil, whose economies had been badly
mauled by the mercantilism of others during the
inter-war period. Neo-mercantilism also became
the orthodoxy of post-imperial states, like India or
Indonesia. And though often attributed to non-
European publicists like the Argentine economist
Raúl Prebisch or to political leaders like Kwame
Nkrumah or Julius Nyerere, such Third World ide-
ologies owed much to the metropolitan schooling of
the new governing elites at institutions such as the
London School of Economics, which had already
left individualist liberalism far behind. The Soviet
Union and other self-proclaimed Communist states
provided little more than variants of a universal ten-
dency towards a more or less benign totalitarianism.
This tide was always most strongly felt in those
states which were large enough to believe in the
possibility of relative national autarky; and in this
respect, the Argentina of Juan Domingo Peron or
the Brazil of Getulio Vargas, at its peak, looked
every bit as plausible as Mussolini's Italy had in
the 1930s.
During the past 20 years this statist mind-set has
once again been reversed. To speak of a long cycle
in which liberal and mercantilist tendencies alter-
nate would be at best premature and at worst naive.
For present purposes it is enough to note that each
successive transition, from mercantilism to liberal-
ism, to neo-mercantilism, and now to neo-liberal-
ism, has been the occasion for fierce public debate
about the incidence and nature of corruption.
Confusion arises not because the term is meaning-
less or vague but because it is valuable. Each side
covets it. The ability to redraw the frontier between
the public and private spheres is central to ideolog-
ical transformations, and accusations of corruption
advance like heralds before the closing armies of
corporatism and neo-liberalism.
3 Crisis and Reform in Argentina,
1983-1995
Let us now turn to the most recent phase of this
process in Argentina. In spite of mounting macro-
economic strains in the mid 1990s, caused by the
Mexican crisis of December 1994 and the inaugura-
tion of the MERCOSUR free trade area in January
1995, the presidency of Carlos Menem seemed to
have achieved in Argentina the elusive combination
of economic reform and political stability which
had so catastrophically eluded the first democratic
administrations in both Argentina and Brazil.
The contrast between Menem's first term (1989-95)
and the presidency of his Radical predecessor
(1983-89) could hardly have been more extreme.
Under Raul Alfonsin, the first president to take
office after the collapse of military authority, the
country experienced rapid inflation, industrial
decline, and currency depreciation as it pursued a
downward career punctuated by heterodox shock
plans, general strikes, and debt renegotiations.
Argentine GDP per capita fell by a quarter during
the 1980s. In 1989, as Alfonsin gave way to
Menem, annual inflation had reached 4,923 per
cent. State-owned enterprises were set to lose $US
5 billion, exceeding their recent average of about
SUS 3 billion a year. Close to half the population of
the capital city were living below the official poverty
line. Servicing of the $US 60 billion external debt
was in arrears by $US 3 billion. Little had been
done to address the financial crisis of the state,
which owed its origins to the corporatist populism
of Juan Domingo Peron, half a century ago.
An economy in this chaotic condition offered man-
ifold opportunities for just the kinds of corruption
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that most offend neo-liberal sensibilities, afflicting
both the core functions of the state and its relations
with civil society A government audit commission
in 1988 revealed that government departments had
spent $US 2 billion over and above market prices
for goods purchased in a year when Alfonsin was
trying to cut public spending by just sus o.s billion
in order to placate the IMP Two years before, an
inquiry into the fiscal system had established that
half the value-added tax collected never reached the
Treasury while bribes to customs officers exceeded
receipts of import duties and 84 per cent of direct
taxation was being paid by less than 30,000 indi-
viduals. State corporations were massively over-
staffed, and the National Mortgage Bank (Banco
Hipotecario Nacional), originally set up to provide
cheap mortgage loans, had become an instrument
of political patronage, with some individuals hold-
ing dozens of loans. Within weeks of taking office,
Menem had ordered an investigation of the 'disap-
pearance', during the 1980s, of $US 67.5 billion
from the Central Bank, most of which had gone to
bail out private sector banks, and been covered by
illegal printing of additional bank notes, fuelling
hyper-inflation.
Corruption was by no means restricted to the fiscal
and economic functions of the state. Walter Little
(1992) was already able to cite abundant evidence
of misuse of office in the civil service, the judiciary,
and the armed forces of several Latin American
countries, as well as among politicians. Worse, he
noted a widespread public perception that corrup-
tion had reached unprecedentedly high levels and
drew attention to the emerging tendency for those
candidates who played the populist anti-corruption
card most strongly during their election campaigns
- Collor in Brazil, Lusinchi in Venezuela and
Menem in Argentina - to be themselves implicated
in corruption once in office. Nothing could be
more calculated to erode the legitimacy of the state
and place democracy itself at risk.
A large part of the solution to corruption on the fis-
cal and economic fronts lay in privatization.
Capital proceeds from sales to foreign firms
promised to ease the public sector deficit and
reduce the external debt, creating an opportunity
for monetary reform. Privatization would put a
stop to the recurrent drain of state subsidies to
loss-making public-sector firms. At the same time,
privatization promised to limit corruption in
appointments, finance and taxation by placing clear
accounting, legal, and organizational boundaries
between corporations and the state. But the oppo-
sition Peronist Party, still strongly tied to the trade
unions, deeply interested in employment levels in
the public sector corporations, and ideologically
opposed to the dismantling of institutions it had
sired in the 1940s andl95Os, blocked implementa-
tion of government commitments to privatization
under the Austral Plan of 1985 and the Primavera
Plan of 1988.
Election of the Peronist candidate Carlos Menem in
the 1989 presidential election exposed this opposi-
tion as partly tactical. Why let the Radicals take the
political credit for a policy which, however difficult
for party stalwarts to swallow, was not only a finan-
cial imperative, but also, according to the polls,
becoming more and more popular? Two sales alone
during the first year of the new administration,
those of the national airline (Aerolíneas Argentinas)
and the telephone company (ENTe1) promised to
reduce the external debt by more than 10 per cent.
Indeed, the sale of 60 per cent of ENTe1 in June
1990 cleared $US 5 billion from the external debt
by a record-breaking debt-equity swap. Whatever
view the unions might take, it had been evident as
early as 1985 that 67 per cent of the inhabitants of
Buenos Aires favoured privatization of a telephone
system that could no longer be relied upon in wet
weather. With privatization came also serious
moves towards trade liberalization, with cuts in
export taxes on agricultural goods and a shift
from sectoral and bilateral liberalization vis-à-vis
Brazil to the more thoroughgoing and outward
looking regionalism of the MERCOSUR free trade
agreement.
In spite of these and other reforms and proposals,
including a November 1990 plan to cut public
employment by 20 per cent (and with it, petty cor-
ruption), the new administration soon had its feet
firmly stuck in the swamp and its nose, many
claimed, in the trough.' There had been doubt from
the outset about the reliance of the President on
Since 1990, corruption has been the focus of intense
public interest in Argentina. Authors like Horacio
Verbitsky (1991), Mariano Grondona (1993), and Luis
Moreno Ocampo (1993) have topped the non-fiction
lists for weeks on end with contributions to the debate.
74
family and friends as aides and appointees, and on
support from the conservative Peronist unions.
Then a succession of incidents during 1990 and
1991 moved corruption to the head of the political
agenda and came close to implicating the President
himself.
The first of these nicely illustrates the difficulties of
reform of the complex bureaucratic structures
bequeathed by decades of authoritarianism. As a
first step towards their privatization, Menem
ordered that state-owned utilities should pay their
way by making charges that reflected real costs. In
a climate of hyper inflation, the firms responded by
what were widely perceived to be arbitrary and
inequitable price increases. Bills for water, electric-
ity, or telephones, sent out monthly because of
rapid inflation, would arrive at neighbouring apart-
ments, one up by a few hundred, the other by sev-
eral thousand per cent. Suspicion grew that
systematic overcharging was being used to substi-
tute for state subsidies and delay painful improve-
ments in efficiency A lively market developed in
the adjustment of meter readings and bills by junior
employees. Payment for electricity in particular
aroused anger as it was widely believed that a sig-
nificant percentage of current was stolen with the
collusion of corrupt senior employees. Although
Menem addressed the ensuing chaos in April 1990
with new regulations on billing and accounting,
some of the mud stuck to his administration, and as
was to happen in each successive corruption scan-
dal, even when it was the government itself that
unearthed the dirt with a sincere intention to
reform.
April 1990 saw a lightning fly-posting campaign
implicating several Menem appointees including his
younger brother and the Minister of Health and
Social Welfare. Public attacks on corruption by the
United States Ambassador and the Catholic Church
early the following year fuelled growing public dis-
content with official corruption and provoked
Menem into a reactive campaign against it. By April
1991, he had lost three cabinet ministers and sev-
eral close aides, but was still dogged by accusations
of drug trafficking and money laundering levelled
against members of his own family Corrupt pro-
curement procedures in the air force, money laun-
dering at Buenos Aires airport (Menem
sister-in-law was finally acquitted of these charges
in 1994), corrupt airport modernization contracts
and adulterated baby food led on to the impeach-
ment of a federal judge in November 1992. This
was followed by legal proceedings against members
of the Supreme Court the following year, revela-
tions of gross financial maladministration at the
Health Ministry in January 1994, and a succession
of tax evasion scandals affecting Peronist trade
unions and state-owned firms.
In neighbouring Brazil, moreover, a disturbingly
parallel course was being pursued by another
recently elected and charismatic president,
Fernando Collor de Mello, who had taken office
less than a year after Menem, in March 1990.
Collor, much more than Menem, had fought on an
explicitly anti-corruption ticket. Collor took power
in circumstances every bit as difficult as those
encountered by Menem and, like Menem, he
pledged himself to reform the economy, in spite of
the lack of broad political support, with the aid of a
team of young technocrats. Privatization got under
way belatedly and haltingly in 1990; but, like
Menem, Collor was also surrounded by corruption
scandals.
Yet the difference in outcomes could hardly have
been more stark. A wave of inquiries into Collor's
affairs revealed evidence of influence peddling,
insider trading, and electoral irregularity
Impeachment proceedings began in September
1992 and by December he had resigned, too late to
prevent the final impeachment vote that stripped
him of office. This was no mere personal catastro-
phe. It constituted a serious setback for economic
reform and democracy in Brazil, where the out-turn
for 1992 was zero growth and 1,200 per cent infla-
tion. The defeat of Collor, however corrupt he may
have been, was also a victory for the forces of an
older corporatism.
4 Cavallo and the Yabran Affair
To Carlos Menem, already battered by a succession
of corruption scandals of his own, the fate of reform
and of its most vocal advocate in Brazil was more
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than a salutary example. lt was a direct source of
pressure, pointing to his own vulnerability with dis-
turbing accuracy In these circumstances, good
news on the economic front was more than wel-
come. And it was Domingo Cavallo PhD (Harvard)
who was delivering it. Before his arrival at the
Economics Ministry in February 1991, Cavallo had
already formulated a strategy he was quick to
implement and tenacious to defend. Reform of the
tax system, institutional and bureaucratic reform
throughout the public sector, and above all, a sound
fully-convertible currency were the clear priorities.
By April, the Austral (later to be re-named the peso)
had been fixed at parity with the United States dol-
lar, a rate defended through thick and thin up to the
time of writing. Annual inflation for 1992 seemed
likely to be close to single figures, much of the state
sector was in private hands, the economy was mov-
ing towards positive real growth for the first time in
years, Argentines were even starting to pay their
taxes, and the budget was close to being balanced.
However much Menem might resent the consider
ably higher popularity ratings of his Economics
Minister, he could not dispense with him.
In spite of these early economic successes, however,
Menem faced mounting opposition from intermedi-
ate social institutions still saturated with the atti-
tudes of the old corporatism. Several Peronist
union leaders publicly withdrew support from
Menem inJuly 1991. The Church supplemented its
démarche against corruption with an attack on the
seeming indifference of the state towards poverty,
deprivation, and unemployment in November that
year. In 1993, economic pressures on marginalized
classes and regions continued to mount, leading to
riots in Santiago del Estero and La Rioja in 1993
and in the major industrial city of Cordoba in
June 1995.
Although they were not enough to turn the elec-
torate against him, these events combined with eco-
nomic setbacks in 1994 and the early months of
1995 to place the newly re-elected President and his
team in a vice not unlike the one that had crushed
Collor. By December 1994, opposition forces in
Congress were strong enough to start a campaign to
drive a wedge between Menem and Cavallo by
demanding modification of clauses relating to fur-
ther privatizations and civil service reforms in the
1995 budget as the price for additional funds to pay
government pensions, as Cavallo encountered an
unanticipated shortfall on the 1994 budget.
Cavallo responded with a public expenditure
'strike', calculated to conserve the funds needed to
meet the legal obligations of government without
making the concessions demanded by Congress. At
the same time, he resorted, not for the first time, to
the leaking of corruption rumours implicating
opponents of the regime. As 1995 progressed,
Cavall® campaigned against corruption allegedly
surrounding the purchase of computing equipment
from IBM by the Central Bank and the forthcoming
postal privatization. And in August 1995, this sea-
soned privatizer of oil, telephone, and utility com-
panies stepped forward to oppose the Bill for
privatization of the state postal system, in spite of
his strong commitment in principle to the need for
more efficient communications. The reason was
that an alliance of Radical and Peronist members of
the Senate had passed a version of the original bill
which, far from opening postal services up to com-
petition, promised to create a virtual monopoly in
private hands, setting up high barriers to entry and
leaving government with little right to inspect the
pnvatized service.
It was above all the means employed to secure this
bill and the nature of the political alliance that lay
behind it that led Cavallo to attack Alfredo Yabran
in Congress towards the end of August 1995.
Yabran, the head of a group whose ostensible busi-
ness centred on delivery services, was alleged to
have employed bribery, threats, and violence in his
bid to convert the national postal, airport, and cus-
toms services into a personal fiefdom. Cavallo went
further, claiming that as well as exerting public con-
trol over his courier services, with its near monop-
oiy of bank clearing business, Yabran effectively
managed additional companies that between them
handled more than half the nation's courier busi-
ness as well as the leading armoured transport and
long-haul trucking firms, placing him in an ideal
position to conduct money-laundering on a grand
scale. Add to this his recent bid for Argentina's sole
printer of bank notes, Ciccone Calcografica, and the
circumstantial evidence began to look impressive.
Yet circumstantial evidence was more or less all
there was, since the use of nominees makes it pos-
sible to conceal ultimate ownership of shares in
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Argentine companies. In short, Cavallo was willing
to go out on a limb, risking his career and the
achievements of four years of reform, to oppose a
privatization which he suspected would lead on to
further corruption. In doing so Cavallo confronted
not simply Yabran, but a cluster of political factions
in the country by now prepared to ally with the
devil himself in order to oust him. These included
elements in the Roman Catholic Church, the labour
movement, and the Peronist party - including the
governor of Buenos Aires Province, Eduardo
Duhalde - committed, whether by interest or con-
science, to halting if not reversing the economic
reforms. The strength of those willing to exploit his
vulnerability was evident in the immediate attempts
made to isolate Cavallo by implying that his attack
was directed implicitly at the highest levels of the
Peronist party, including the President himself.
Corruption scandals have a way of running and
running. Though proof might be lacking, Cavallo
convinced a majority of the 28,000 workers in the
many local savings banks within the state postal
services, who in turn put pressure on the Radical
party When the Postal Bill came to the Chamber of
Deputies following the attack by Cavallo on Yabran,
the Radicals withdrew their support and effectively
killed it.
The difference between the Yabran affair and the
corruption scandals of the first Menem term were
profound. This time, Cavallo had targeted not just
anti-reform factions in the legislature but the new
corruption of the private sector as represented by
Yabran. Moreover, for the first time the techno-
cratic Economics Minister, notoriously lacking any
conventional political power base, had succeeded in
mobilizing a nation-wide constituency in his sup-
port. Not yet 50, apparently incorruptible, Cavallo
proved by the Yabran affair that he was capable of
marshalling conventional political forces to get his
way, and that he was no more tolerant of private
than of public subversion of a liberal economy But
for democracy to be better secured against the kind
of tactical alliances of old and new corruption
which Cavallo faced in 1995 would require one
additional reform, as much social as political. That
is a democratization, in place of the marginalization
of recent years, of those intermediate social institu-
tions that have been most resistant to economic
reform in Argentina, but without which neither
reform nor democracy is likely to thrive in the
long run.
5 Conclusion
The immediate political and financial backlash
against Cavallo demonstrated the vulnerability of
technocrats without any traditional power base to
pressure from trade union, religious and political
factions justifiably embittered by the way their con-
stituents had suffered from cutbacks in state spend-
ing on social services and the opening of the
Argentine economy to international competition.
For reforming administrations to be able to con-
front the corruption associated with emergent pri-
vate monopolies, some loss of executive power and
slower implementation of reforms is a fair price to
pay provided political parties, trade unions, and
religious, municipal, and professional bodies, con-
structively reformed, can subsequently be counted
on to sustain and deepen reform. To override rather
than reform such intermediate institutions is to
offer the emergent Mafiosi of the neoliberal order
rich possibilities of tactical alliance with the demor-
alized, corrupt, yet still legitimate residuum of cor-
poratism. But few things are harder for the current
generation of neoliberal Jacobins to accept than
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